Secure Manhattan distance computation allows two parties to privately compute the Manhattan distance of their points, which is important and has broad applications. In this paper, we present a protocol for secure Manhattan distance computation based on phase shift operation. Because of quantum mechanics' physical principle, our protocol can also resist outside attacks and don't leak any private information of participants.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many quantum cryptographic protocols, such as quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] - [3] , quantum secret sharing (QSS) [4] - [7] , quantum secure direction communication (QSDC) [8] - [10] , and so on, have been proposed to solve various secure problems.
The concept of secure two-party computation is introduced by Yao [11] and then Goldreich O pointed out that extending secure two-party computation to secure multi-party computation(SMC) is an important research direction [12] . In SMC, multiple parties can jointly compute a function of their private inputs without revealing any private information. Hence, post-quantum cryptography is a very active field of research in recent ten years [13] , [14] . As we know, quantum cryptography has the advantage of higher security than classical cryptography and no one knows when exactly large quantum computers will exist. So in [15] , Shor pointed out that SMC tasks can be performed more efficiently by models based on quantum setting than those based on classical setting. This viewpoint leads many researchers to explore special SMC problems in quantum setting.
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In 2011, Jia et al. [16] proposed a quantum protocol for millionaire problem with d-level entangled GHZ states. Then Lin et al. [17] put forward a protocol based on d-level Bell states, in which the secrets are encoded in the shift of the qubit. In 2013, Zhang et al. [18] proposed a quantum protocol for millionaire problem based on d-dimension Bell states resources and single particle measurements. In 2013, Guo et al. [19] proposed a quantum private comparison protocol based on entanglement swapping of d-level Bell states. In 2014, Zhou et al. [20] gave a quantum protocol for millionaire problem with continuous-variable EPR states. In 2009, Yang and Wen [21] proposed a quantum private comparison protocol based on the decoy photon and twophoton EPR states. Then, Chen et al. [22] proposed a new quantum private comparison protocol to deal with the private comparison of equal information based on the simple single-particle measurement and the triplet entangled GHZ states. In [23] , [24] , Liu et al. proposed some quantum private comparison protocols based on the triplet W states, χ−type states. These protocols all included a semi-honest third party(TP). In 2010, Chen et al. [25] presented a quantum summation protocol with the multi-particle entangled GHZ states. In 2014, Zhang et al. [26] employed single photons in both polarization and spatial-mode degrees of freedom to design a quantum summation protocol. In 2015, Zhang et al. [27] proposed a quantum summation protocol based on the genuinely maximally entangled six-qubit states. In 2016, Shi et al. [28] present a quantum summation protocol based on quantum Fourier transform and CNOT gate operators. In 2011, Jakobi et al. [29] gave a practical private database queries protocol. In 2011, Liu et al. [30] presented a private database queries protocol based on QKD. In 2018, Wei et al. [31] proposed a private database queries protocol based on quantum oblivious key transfer. In 2019, Gao et al. [32] surveyed previous quantum private query protocols.
Secure Manhattan distance computation(SMDC) is a new SMC problem, which enables two parties to privately compute the Manhattan distance between their points. It has lots of practical applications, such as secure scientific computing, information filtering, bioinformatics and so on. And it is an essential part of privacy-preserving clustering data mining. In [33] , Fang et al. computed the Manhattan distance without revealing any information by designing two different coding methods and the use of classical homomorphic encryption algorithm. To the best of our knowledge, no solution of SMDC based on quantum cryptography has been found yet. Based on the framework of [33] , we use the same 0−1 coding scheme and phase shift operation to design a novel quantum protocol, which can securely compute the Manhattan distance. We can get the Manhattan distance using quantum private comparison protocol. In those quantum private comparison protocol, entanglement states, joint measurement and unitary operations are needed. In our protocol, we only need phase shift operation and single-state measurement, which are easier to be realized with current technologies. Compared to other previous quantum private comparison protocols, our protocol is more practical.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces some correlative preliminaries. Section 3 describes the proposed protocol in detail. Section 4 proves the correctness and the security of our protocol. Finally, Section 5 gives a discussion and conclusion.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. PHASE SHIFT OPERATION
Here we first introduce phase shift operation U (θ ), which will be used in our protocol. The phase shift operation U (θ) is cos(θ ) |0 0| − sin(θ ) |0 1| + sin(θ ) |1 0| + cos(θ) |1 1|. U (θ ) performed on particle |0 or |1 is defined as follows:
Furthermore, for particle |0 , we can get (2) , as shown at the bottom of this page.
For particle |1 and we can get the same result U (θ 2 )U (θ 1 ) |1 = U (θ 2 + θ 1 ) |1 .
We use the coding scheme in [33] to denote private points. Supposed that there is a complete set U = {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n }, where u 1 , . . . , u n are continuous integers and
. . , n) can be determined by the following ruler:
can be proved as follows:
According to the coding scheme, we
cos(θ 1 ) − sin(θ 1 ) sin(θ 1 ) cos(θ 1 ) |0 = cos(θ 2 ) cos(θ 1 ) − sin(θ 2 ) sin(θ 1 ) − cos(θ 2 ) sin(θ 1 ) − sin(θ 2 ) cos(θ 1 ) sin(θ 2 ) cos(θ 1 ) + cos(θ 2 ) sin(θ 1 ) − sin(θ 2 ) sin(θ 1 ) + cos(θ 2 ) cos(θ 1 ) |0
It is obviously that |x
For y A , y B , we can get the similar conclusion
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
We present the quantum protocol for secure Manhattan distance computation in this section.
Supposed that two parties, Alice and Bob, have pri-
With the help of a semihonest third party Calvin, they privately get
The detailed quantum SMDC protocol is described as follows:
(1) Calvin prepares a particles sequence S C = (P 1,1 , P 1,2 , . . . , P 1,n , P 2,1 , P 2,2 , . . . , P 2,n ) and each P i,j (i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2, . . . , n) is randomly chosen from {|0 , |1 }.
Calvin inserts L particles into S C for each particle in {|0 , |1 , |+ , |− }. After recording the insert positions Po C , he sends the sequence S C of (2n + L) particles to Alice.
(2) After receiving S C , Calvin announces Po C and the measurement basis of these insert qubits. Alice and Calvin measure the insert qubits and determine the error rate by comparing. If the error rate is less than the threshold they preset, they discard the checking particles and get a particles sequence S C = (P 1,1 , P 1,2 , . . . , P 1,n , P 2,1 , P 2,2 , . . . , P 2,n ). Otherwise, they abort this protocol and restart it.
(3) Alice performs phase shift operations U (θ A i,j )U (θ A i,j ) on the particle P i,j (i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2, . . . , n) and then gets a sequence S A = (P 1,1 , . . . , P 1,n , P 2,1 , . . . , P 2,n ), where θ A i,j is randomly selected from (0, 2π ] and θ A i,j is prepared according to C A by the following ruler:
Alice inserts L particles into S A for each particle in {|0 , |1 , |+ , |− }. After recording the insert positions Po A , she sends the sequence S A of (2n + L) particles to Bob. (4) After receiving S A , Alice announces Po A and the measurement basis of these insert qubits. Alice and Bob measure the insert qubits and determine the error rate by comparing. If the error rate is less than the threshold they preset, they discard the checking particles and get a particles sequence S A = (P 1,1 , . . . , P 1,n , P 2,1 , . . . , P 2,n ). Otherwise, they abort this protocol and restart it.
(5) Bob performs phase shift operations U (θ B i,j )U (θ B i,j ) on the particle P i,j (i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2, . . . , n) and gets a sequence S B = (P 1,1 , . . . , P 1,n , P 2,1 , . . . , P 2,n ), where θ B i,j is randomly selected from (0, 2π ] and θ B i,j is prepared according to C B by the following ruler:
Bob inserts L particles into S B for each particle in {|0 , |1 }, {|+ , |− }. After recording the insert positions Po B , he sends the sequence S B of (2n + L) particles to Alice. (6) After receiving S B , Bob announces the insert positions Po B and the measurement basis of these insert qubits. Bob and Calvin measure the insert qubits and determine the error rate by comparing. If the error rate is less than the threshold they preset, they discard the checking particles and get a particles sequence S B = (P 1,1 , . . . , P 1,n , P 2,1 , . . . , P 2,n ) and continue the next step. Otherwise, they abort this protocol and restart it. (7) Alice and Bob send 2π
. . , n) and uses X basis to measure P i,j . If the measuring result is equal to P i,j , Calvin sets r i,j = 0; Otherwise Calvin sets r i,j = 1. 
IV. ANALYSIS A. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS
In this section, we show that if Alice, Bob and Calvin honestly execute the protocol above, the output is correct.
According to Eq.(2), the particle P i,j (i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2, . . . , n) in Step (7) is written as follows:
(1) If c A i,j = c B i,j = 0, then θ B i,j = θ A i,j = 0:
( cos(π) − sin(π ) sin(π ) cos(π ) ) |0 = − |0 ( cos(π ) − sin(π ) sin(π ) cos(π ) ) |1 = − |1
If the measuring result of P i,j is equal to P i,j , then D(A, B) .
For example, supposed that U = {−1, 0, 1, 2}. The 0 − 1 code of point (2, −1) is (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0 ) and the 0 − 1 code of point (−1, 0) is (1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0. Calvin prepares a particles sequence S C = (|1 , |0 , |1 , |1 , |0 , |1 , |1 , |0 ). Alice performs phase shift operations on the particles of S C and gets S A = (U (θ A 1,1 )U ( π 2 ) |1 ,
Alice performs phase shift operations on the particles of S A and gets
on the particles of S B and gets S C = (− |1 , |1 , |0 , |0 , − |0 , |0 , |1 , |0 ). By comparing the measurement results of S C and S C , four positions are not equal and the Manhattan distance of (2, −1), (−1, 0) is 4.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Firstly, we will show that our protocol can resist the outside attack, such as eavesdropping attack, Trojan horse attack. Secondly, we will show that our protocol can also resist the attack from inside dishonest participants.
1) OUTSIDE ATTACK
In Step (1), Calvin randomly chose original particles from {|0 , |1 }, which are only known by him. Calvin inserted some particles to check the eavesdropping attacker. Through these checking particles, Calvin can find eavesdropping easily. It is obviously that Alice and Bob can find eavesdropping attacker using the same method.
There are two kinds of Trojan horse attacks: photonnumber-splitting (PNS) attack and invisible photon attack. For stopping the PNS attack, we can use the technology of beam splitters to split the sampling signals and judge whether these received photons are single photons or multiple photons. For stopping the invisible photon attack, we can insert filters in front of their devices to filter out the photon signal with an illegitimate wavelength.
From the analysis above, we can know that our quantum protocol is robust against outside attacks.
2) PARTICIPANT ATTACK
The term ''participant attack'', which emphasizes that the attacks from dishonest users are generally more powerful and should be paid more attention to, is first proposed by Gao et al in Ref. [34] and has attracted much attention in the cryptanalysis of quantum cryptography [35] - [40] . We analyze the possibility of Alice, Bob and Calvin to get information about A, B as follows:
Case 1: Alice wants to learn Bob's private point B =  (x B , y B ).
In our protocol, Alice can get P 1,1 , . . . , P 1,n , P 2,1 , . . . , P 2,n from Calvin, which are not related to Bob's private point. So she cannot learn any information about Bob's private point.
Case 2: Bob wants to learn Alice's private point A = (x A , y A ).
In our protocol, Bob's legal resources in his hand are U (θ A 1,1 )U (θ A 1,1 )P 1,1 , . . . , U (θ A 1,n )U (θ A 1,n )P 1,n , U (θ A 2,1 )U (θ A 2,1 ) P 2,1 , . . . , U (θ A 2,n )U (θ A 2,n )P 2,n , θ B 1,1 , . . . , θ B 1,n , θ B 2,1 , . . . , θ B 2,n and θ B 1,1 , . . . , θ B 1,n , θ B 2,1 , . . . , θ B 2,n . U (θ A i,j )(i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2, .., n) is related to Alice's private point. The eavesdropping of Bob can be described by a unitary operation U BA together with an ancillary particle E i,j [37] .
where |e 00 , |e 01 , |e 10 , |e 11 are four states determined by the unitary operation U E and α 2 + β 2 = χ 2 + δ 2 = 1. We assume the initial particle is P i,j = |0 . After Alice's phase shift operation, P i,j will become P i,j = cos(θ A i,j + θ A i,j ) |0 + sin(θ A i,j + θ A i,j ) |1 . Bob attacks P i,j , then P i,j will become as follow: 
Calvin is semi-honest who will execute the protocol loyally, and keep a record of all intermediate computing results. Calvin might try to derive two parties' private points from the record, but he won't cooperate with Alice or Bob.
In our protocol, Calvin obtains the result c A i,j ⊕ c B i,j and knows whether c
The maximal probability of correct messages guessed by Calvin is ( 1 2 ) 2n , where 2n is the length of Alice's and Bob's 0 − 1 codes. Alice and Bob can increase the length of their 0 − 1 codes to obtain higher security.
So Alice, Bob and Calvin can not get any information about other parties' private information.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
As we mentioned in introduction, no solution of SMDC based on quantum cryptography has been found yet. But we can get the Manhattan distance using quantum private comparison protocol times. Firstly, we compare our SMDC protocol with the QPC protocols of Refs. [21] - [24] without considering the security check processes. Although we can get the Manhattan distance using quantum private comparison protocol, Table 1 clearly shows that the performance of the proposed SMDC protocols has advantages over the protocols of Refs. [21] - [24] . Phase shift operation and singlestate measurement are easier to be realized with current technologies than entanglement states, joint measurement and the unitary operations. So our protocol is efficient and practical.
In summary, we first present a quantum method to solve SMDC in this paper. Alice and Bob use two 0 − 1 codes to denote their private points A, B. After performing some phase shift operations on the particles prepared by Calvin, Alice and Bob can privately obtain the Manhattan distance between two points. The correctness and security of our protocol are proved.
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